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The national and the international 
The narrative of Western dominance describes IR as a field organised around national 
traditions. It denounces the existence of Eurocentric international gate-keeping 
practices that silence the voices of ‘scholars from the Global South’ and prevent the 
internationalisation of their publications. Such gate-keeping practices would prevent 
scholars from ‘the Global South’ from expressing their national traditions, distinct from 
what is produced internationally, as the gate-keepers of the journals (mainly ‘Western’ 
scholars) are Eurocentric. 
 This narrative that I have called the narrative of Western dominance contains a 
series of implicit assumptions regarding the relationship between what is defined as 
‘national’ and ‘international’. The obviousness or naturalness (naturalité) of these 
assumptions is questioned by elements exposed in the first three chapters. First, 
analysing the geographical, linguistic and disciplinary scope by Brazilian and Indian 
publications reveals (by way of contrast) that the literature implicitly reduces the 
international space of publication to ‘the West’. Or, more precisely, it reduces it to 
Anglo-American, English-speaking IR journals. However, Brazilian scholars publish 
abroad in languages other than English. A large share of their publications is produced 
outside the geographical networks of IR scholars, in Latin America. Moreover, the 
multi-disciplinary nature of IR in Brazil and India (for example in history and area 
studies) makes some Indian and Brazilian scholars epistemically closer to other 
disciplines abroad than to IR as defined by Anglo-American journals. 
 Second, internationalisation of national fields resulting from transnationalisation 
of the education of Brazilian scholars challenges the clear-cut division between national 
and international IR traditions. Scholars’ experiences of national specificities do not 
reflect the meaning attributed to them by the critical literature. Scholars do not invest 
in them or construct them as national anti-hegemonic tools against an alleged 
international ‘mainstream literature’. 
 Third, the role played by the state (regarding foreign policy and higher education 
policies) challenges the idea that the practices of ‘non-Western’ scholars, and their 
visibility, is a result of international IR dynamics. Scholars’ professional habits are 
mainly conditioned by their relationship with the government and the relationship 
between IR and other national fields.  
These findings raise a series of questions regarding the relationship between ‘the 
national’ and ‘the international’ in IR: what/where is ‘the international’? What does our 
current socialisation into these categories of thought prevent us from perceiving? What 
social interests are supported by their use? 
 The first three chapters zoomed in on the socio-historical processes at work in 
the construction of IR in Brazil and India. These chapters showed that, although the 
critical literature aimed at accounting for the local voices and contexts of IR production, 
it failed to take into consideration the role of national factors in the production and 
internationalisation of IR. Drawing on these conclusions, Chapter 4 zooms out from the 
national conditions of internationalisation. It focuses on how processes identified as 
‘international’ or ‘national’ interact and affect the relationship between the 
internationalisation and diversification of IR. 
 This endeavour requires us to go beyond bridging the gap separating the study 
of ‘the domestic’ and ‘the international’ (Chapter 3). Rather, we have to join the 
discussions taking ‘the international’ as an object of research on its own. Scholars have 
developed new tools, like multi-level analysis, to catch up analytically with the 
transformation of objects of inquiry (like governance) (Rosenau and Czempiel 1992; 
Risse-kappen 1996; Buzan 1995). If multi-level analyses have the advantage of bridging 
the gap between domestic and international studies, they still tend to identify ‘the 
international’ with a level of analysis (macro) differentiated from the national (meso) 
and local (micro). Another way of approaching the problem is to deconstruct the 
‘international’ as an implicit level of analysis and approach it, rather, as a ‘process’ 
(Basaran et al. 2016). New approaches to IR, like International Political Sociology, 
directly engage the ‘problem of the international’ by decentring the analysis of ‘the 
interstate system or variations of scaled-up state forms of politics’. This builds on 
previous approaches like ‘diffusion (Strange 1996), transnationalising (Keohane and 
Nye 1977), networks (Slaughter 2005), transversal practice (Roland 2000), global 
assemblages (Saskia 2006)’ (defined by Jef Huysmans and Joao Pontes Nogueira as 
‘fracturing IR’, 2016). Through increased attention to the ‘everyday international’, 
scholars question the way ‘the international’ dwells and is experienced in everyday life 
(Montison 2010; Shim 2016; Guillaume 2011). Along with authors engaged in a ‘local 
turn’ (Mac Ginty and Richmond 2013), this has led to the diffusion of immersive 
methodologies, like ethnography, into the discipline (MacKay and Levin 2015; Vrasti 
2008; Rancatore 2010). 
 By not taking into account these methodological reflexions, scholars run the risk 
of producing discourses about ‘the international’ that are cut off from the complexity of 
the world and disconnected from the situation and lived experiences of people ‘on the 
ground’. This analytical myopia, and the lack of exposure by researchers to the local 
contexts, creates a dangerous space where Eurocentrism can safely spread. The ‘Global 
IR’ literature has neither engaged the methodological and ontological discussions 
exposed above, nor problematised its relationship towards ‘the international’. This 
absence raises the question of the cognitive and social consequences of the implicit 
relationship between ‘the national’ and ‘the international’ naturalised by the narrative 
of Western dominance. To denaturalise the implicit links established between these 
commonly opposed categories, Chapter 4 aims to answer the following question: What 
is the relationship between ‘the national’ and ‘the international’ in regards to the 
internationalisation and diversification of IR? 
 I have identified three main concerns in the way ‘the national’ and ‘the 
international’ are articulated as explanatory categories in the narrative of Western 
dominance. First, I will expose the reification of ‘the international’ and ‘the national’ 
by the narrative of Western dominance. I will show the analytical weakness of the idea 
of ‘non-Western national traditions’ in contexts where IR has been recently 
institutionalised, has international origins and is sub-nationally diverse. From that 
angle, ‘the international’ should rather be considered as a process that happens jointly 
with processes of nationalisation. In the second section, I will show how, despite its 
reification of ‘the international’ and ‘the national’, the narrative of Western dominance 
merges ‘the international’ and ‘the national’ and fails to perceive them as two distinct 
spaces of professional engagement and struggle. Indeed, the analysis of the sub-national 
struggles for diversity and emancipation shows that the literature does not account for 
the existence of different social spaces – national and international – for which 
processes of diversification and struggles for emancipation may be different and even 
contradictory. Finally, a focus on the perceptions of Indian and Brazilian scholars will 
reveal how their experiences and the meaning they give to the objects ‘national’ and 
‘international’ contradicts the narrative of Western dominance, thereby challenging the 
implicit projections within this discourse. 
‘National traditions’, internationalisation and the reification of 
the national and the international 
Does the idea of ‘national traditions’ make sense for countries where IR is recent and 
has foreign origins? What should be considered national, given that scholars are aware 
of the foreign influences at the origin of IR in their country, as well as its sub-national 
variations? What’s more, scholars perceive the field as still in the process of being 
structured, due to its rapid genesis and huge transformation. So, what should be 
considered traditional? 
 The case of IR in Brazil and India challenges the common discourse on ‘national 
traditions’. Based on this comparative analysis, I will show that the narrative of Western 
dominance discourse doubly reifies ‘the international’ and ‘the national’. On the one 
hand, rather than one tradition per nation, IR is sub-nationally diverse. This diversity is 
organised around two types of factors: the diversity of the country’s sub-national 
geopolitical interests and the varied foreign origins of IR national production. ‘National 
traditions’ are thus internationalised and sub-nationally diverse rather than 
homogeneous and exclusive. On the other hand, in Brazil and India, the processes of 
nationalisation and the internationalisation of IR national fields go hand in hand. This 
characteristic highlights the implicit model commonly used to describe the 
internationalisation of science: a process of growing interconnection between scientific 
fields that existed as national entities prior to their internationalisation. 
 I will expose the state of IR sub-national diversity in Brazil before doing the 
same for India. 
IR sub-national diversity in Brazil 
In Brazil, IR diversity reflects the territorial diversity of the country’s socio-economic, 
territorial and geopolitical interests. This diversity more importantly, reflects, however, 
the specialisation of institutions in competition within the national space; institutions 
that have been unevenly influenced by international traditions as a result of the 
transnationalisation of second-generation scholars. 
 Brazil is a federal state composed of five regions and twenty-six states; a country 
of 8,514,876km2 that shares a border with all South American countries except Ecuador 
and Chile”. Its main economic centre is the southeast region, which hosts the megacities 
of São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, and is responsible for 60 per cent of Brazil’s GNP. 
The capital, Brasilia, is located in the Federal District, in the central-west region. 
 The size and the heterogeneity of Brazil mean that different parts of the territory 
are more sensitive to different international issues. Institutions’ areas of expertise follow 
the map of the regional and local socio-economic and geopolitical interests. In his study 
of federal IR university programmes, Marcos Ferreira (2016) shows that the two federal 
universities of Amapá and Roraima in the Amazonian states focus on environmental 
and security issues in the Amazon Basin, whereas federal universities near the borders 
tend to focus on security and integration issues. 
 In this context, the uneven territorial distribution of IR in the country favours the 
subjects that are in line with the local interests of the regions that are most represented. 
The multiplication of IR programmes has led to territorial expansion of IR. However, 
certain regions remain underrepresented. To take but one example, IR is barely taught 
in the north of Brazil, the region with more interests in the Caribbean. Accordingly, the 
Caribbean is not an area investigated by Brazilian scholars despite the presence of 
Brazil in the region. 
 Moreover, IR expansion has not bridged the institutional gap between, on the 
one side, the main cities and the richest regions where most of the programmes are 
concentrated, and, on the other side, what Brazilians refer to as ‘the interior’ of the 
country. Agreements between the new and/or isolated programmes and those that are 
strongly established aim to compensate for these imbalances. The multi-disciplinary 
scheme Dinter (Programa de Doutorado Interinstitucional em Educação) favours, for 
instance, postgraduate mobility for short stays in other institutions. These measures 
cannot, however, counter-balance the fact that the expansion of IR has reinforced the 
institutional capacity of the biggest cities. The concentration of IR programmes remains 
in big metropolises: Brasilia, Rio, and São Paulo. The first PhD programmes were 
created in the early 2000s in the cities where IR was first established: Brasilia and Rio. 
 In 2009, Norma Breda and Fúlvio Eduardo Fonseca estimated that fifty-five out 
of eighty-nine programmes were located in federal capitals (Breda and Fonseca 2009, 
356). Most of the programmes are in the southeast region (53.1 per cent), south region 
(23.4 per cent) and central-west region (10.2 per cent). Of the IR student capacity 
authorised by the government 82.7 per cent is concentrated in seven states1 in the south 
and southeast regions and the Federal District (11,152 seats in eighty-one programmes, 
while the other states are endowed with 2,330 authorised seats in seventeen 
programmes) (Julião 2012, 28). Most scholarships benefit the southeast region (Breda 
and Fonseca 2009, 370). Finally, within the well-provided southeast region, the state of 
São Paulo has benefited the most from the expansion. With no programme in the 1980s, 
it offers 58 per cent of the programmes of the region twenty years later (Julião 2012, 
27–8). 
 However, the diversity of regional interests is not the main factor that leads to 
the sub-national diversity of IR in Brazil. The introduction of foreign approaches to IR, 
resulting from the transnationalisation of second-generation scholars’ education, has 
not been homogeneously integrated into existing national practices (which also had 
previously imported foreign origins). The national diversification of the IR curricula 
and research agenda has led to a sub-national specialisation among the main research 
centres, fuelling institutional competition and mirroring the IR rifts happening outside 
the country. Instead of identifying one national tradition, the interviewees’ discourses 
identified four competing traditions in the national field, none of them being exclusively 
‘national’. Based on (1) scholars’ description of their professional experiences within 
their present and past institutions and (2) scholars’ comments on other institutions and 
their reputation, I will present a typology of these four sub-national traditions according 
to their disciplinary, epistemological and theoretical affinities, as well as the students’ 
career prospects.2 
 The first tradition is the one I have described as existing at the foundation of IR 
in Brazil. Scholars clearly identified it as the tradition ‘of the UnB’ (University of 
Brasilia), ‘of Brasilia’ or ‘the Brazilian historical tradition’. It is influenced by the field 
of history, and most notably the French tradition of the history of international relations 
embodied by Renouvin and Duroselle and their book Introduction à l’Histoire des 
Relations Internationales (1964). Starting from diplomatic history, the tradition moved 
towards international history and increasingly integrated elements of political analysis 
(Santos 2005). Works in this line are characterised by the use of archives and 
interpretive methods and often focus on Brazilian foreign policy.3 In 1999, Almeida 
underlined that the tradition of ‘historical studies’ was one of the core approaches of IR 
in Brazil, far from the typologies usually used abroad (‘realism, neorealism, 
institutionalism, idealism’) (pp. 135–6). 
 The historical tradition is associated with the UnB and benefits from the 
influence of this institution. At the end of the 1980s, the UnB was the only university 
offering IR undergraduate and postgraduate programmes in Brazil. Being the first IR 
programme in the country and the best ranked nationally up to date, the UnB has been 
a model for the establishment of other programmes (Jatobá 2013, 38; Julião 2012, 26). 
On the website of the UnB, the webpage presenting the IREL (the IR research centre) 
is titled: ‘iREL, uma tradição’ (‘the iREL, a tradition’). For most scholars from the UnB 
and PUC-Rio (Pontifical Catholic University of Rio) interviewed, if one sub-national 
tradition should be considered as ‘the’ Brazilian tradition, it should be this one. The 
following excerpt illustrates the position of a scholar from the UnB: 
Q – Do you think the UnB could represent a Brazilian tradition? 
A – Totally! It’s the tradition. Because among the programmes, the undergraduate 
degree of the UnB was the first to be created in Brazil, and then the postgraduate 
programme. There’s a little historical account of the discipline in the article I 
wrote. But, I’m not saying that it’s the best thing in the world, nothing of the sort, 
but in Brazil, when you speak about International Relations, generally, in the 
common sense, you think about the UnB. 
Scholars in Brazil describe this tradition as the furthest away from what they perceive 
as ‘the American model’ (further details below). The fact that a researcher from the 
UnB mentioned that it was not compulsory to work within the historical tradition to be 
hired at the UnB shows, in contrast, the specialisation of the institution. He commented 
that some faculty members ‘even have an American mindset!’ (‘aqui há gente que tem 
cabeça americana!’). 
 The historical tradition is also present in other public and private institutions. A 
famous example is the Centro de Pesquisa e Documentação Contemporânea (CPDOC) 
of the Fundação Getulio Vargas, dedicated since 1973 to the written and oral archiving 
of the history of Brazil, which includes a focus on Brazilian foreign policy. 
 A second tradition adopts a more theoretical line and a declared critical 
commitment. This tradition is also characterised by an interest in political theory and 
notably ‘French theory’ (Cusset 2005). Such a tradition can be represented by PUC-
Rio. This institution is perceived as the most internationalised within the Brazilian field. 
The director of the IR research centre of the university (the IRI), João Nogueira, 
underlined in his interview that this internationalisation was actively pursued by the 
institution. He was himself the co-editor of one of the International Studies Association 
journals International Political Sociology between 2012 and 2016. The private status 
of the university enables flexibility when hiring in comparison to public institutions. 
Due to their civil servant status, permanent staff in public institutions are required to be 
resident in Brazil at least two years before taking the job examination (the ‘concurso’). 
In comparison, the IRI hires on a permanent ‘non-exclusive’ basis internationally 
renowned scholars who align with its critical profile, such as R.B.J. Walker, Nicholas 
Onuf, Anna Leander and Stefano Guzzini. 
 The third tradition is influenced by American political science and quantitative 
methods. The IR research centre at the University of São Paulo (USP) (also called IRI) 
embodies this tradition. Students are trained in quantitative methods and attend classes 
in the department of mathematics. The level in statistics is assessed by two exams: at 
the beginning and the end of the PhD programme. Scholars who identify themselves 
with this tradition explicitly distinguish themselves from what is done at the UnB. This 
can be explained by the fact that in terms of disciplinary scope and methodology, the 
UnB and USP have emerged as the most opposed sub-national traditions in the Brazilian 
field. The following excerpt quotes a scholar from USP describing what she perceived 
to be the opposition between these two traditions: 
Q – And between this potential Brazilian tradition and what is done in the United States, 
for example… what would you prefer? 
A – I prefer what is done in the United States. It’s closer to what I do in terms of research 
and methodology, right? It’s much closer. I mean, because of all the research I’ve 
done, it’s got a specific methodology. Erm I mean… I have little training in 
history, even in the history of international relations. Thus, I have almost no 
articles published in this more general line that is done here in Brazil. Erm, I think 
that it is also because of the institutions. Those who do well with those 
interpretative analyses are, for example, people from the UnB who have a very 
strong course in the history of international relations. And here, we’ve always 
been – here in São Paulo and at the USP in particular – we’ve stuck more closely 
to political science, which is American political science. Which is where I got 
trained, I mean, where I then went and stayed; this has meant that I’m more aligned 
with this orientation, this is it. 
The competition among IR traditions is intertwined with the competition among the 
major IR institutions, which itself is part of the competition among the three centres of 
power in Brazil: Brasilia, Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo. Besides this multi-layered 
opposition among IR’s most visible players, most programmes fall within the scope of 
a fourth tradition that can be qualified as ‘professionalising’. These programmes address 
mainly undergraduate students in private universities and answer the demand of the job 
market in the public and private sectors (Cesa 2012, 1–2). The ‘lato sensu’ IR 
programmes mentioned in Chapter 1 fall into this category. The most prestigious 
institutional example is the Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV), established in Rio in 1944 
to prepare Brazilian executives. It now has a satellite in São Paulo, with IR programmes 
at both sites. Overall, these ‘lato sensu’ programmes are located in the main economic 
centres of the country like São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Parana, Santa Catarina, Minas 
Gerais, Brasilia, Bahia, Pernambuco and Ceara (Vinzentini 2005, 23). 
IR sub-national diversity in India 
In India, IR diversity reflects mainly the territorial diversity of the country’s socio-
economic, territorial and geopolitical interests. The difficult constitution of a national 
field both comes from and results in IR Delhi-centrism. In the absence of such a national 
field, the institutional competition and specialisation taking place in Brazil do not take 
place in the country. 
 Like in Brazil, the size and diversity of the country influence IR production. 
India is a federal country composed of thirty-six states and Union territories. India’s 
coastline measures 7,517km.4 The number of bordering countries, the length of the 
border and the total land areas are subject to debate because some borders are disputed. 
The United Nations lists the total land area as 2,973,190km2. 
 Even more than in Brazil, India’s regional diversity influences the sub-national 
diversity of IR production. Interviewees suggested their geographical location as an 
important factor influencing their perspective and research interests. India’s 
international relations raise matters of national security that unevenly affect different 
parts of the country (for example, the Kashmir dispute with Pakistan, the China–India 
border territory dispute and the Myanmar–India cross-border issues). The investigation 
I conducted in Chennai, for instance, revealed two local specialisations related to this 
geographical location: the Sri Lankan Tamils’ immigration in Indian Tamil Nadu and 
maritime issues. Since independence, hundreds of thousands of Tamils have been 
deported and repatriated back and forth between India and Sri Lanka following 
citizenship regulations and conflict outbreaks. Regarding maritime issues, Chennai is 
the second biggest Indian port after Mumbai and the largest in the south and eastern 
coasts. Interviewees working on maritime issues explicitly mentioned that the fact 
Chennai was a port was the reason why they specialised in this topic: 
Me personally, I took maritime issues because I’m located in this place called 
Chennai, which is a seaport. If you look at the map, Chennai opens up to the 
south-east region actually. It opens up to the Bay of Bengal and to the Indian 
Ocean […], so it is more the geographical positioning that makes people to 
choose topics actually, and for me, I found that maritime security would help 
because it is one way to look at India in a different perspective altogether. 
The choice of a specialisation may be temporary, as revealed by the trajectory of 
scholars who tried to make the most of a short-term appointment in a region to deepen 
their knowledge of local issues. This is, for instance, the case with an interviewee whose 
first job was in Jammu (a Himalayan state bordering Pakistan) and who took the 
opportunity of this location to learn more about the situation in Kashmir. Regarding 
Delhi, several interviewees mentioned that one could not understand foreign policy by 
the mere fact of being Indian or working in India. To have a realistic idea of the stakes 
and power relations that determine Indian foreign policy, they argued, one must work 
in Delhi, closer to the political milieus, and spend time networking and circulating in 
Indian think tanks. 
 The competition that takes place between IR institutions in Brazil does not 
happen in India. The enduring Delhi-centrism of IR in India, and the lack of national 
institutions capable of structuring a national professional space, contradict the potential 
creation of an integrated national field within which different traditions would compete 
(see p. 000). If in Brazil the expansion of IR decentred the institutionalisation of the 
discipline from its origins in the capital Brasilia, in India, the territorial organisation of 
IR in the 2010s remains quite similar to the 1980s. 
 New programmes were created both in Delhi and outside the capital, but the 
‘Delhi-centrism’ of the discipline has not been challenged. Most IR institutions, both in 
and outside academia, are located in Delhi. As mentioned on p. 000, only three Schools 
of International Relations have gained national recognition outside Delhi (in 
Pondicherry, Kottayam and Calcutta) while all major universities in Delhi (such as 
Delhi University, Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), Jamia Millia Islamia or the South 
Asian University) host IR programmes. Comprising thirteen research centres, the 
School of International Studies (SIS) at JNU remains the biggest IR research centre in 
the country with around seventy-five faculty members. The development of think tanks, 
also located in the capital, confirms the Delhi-centrism of the discipline.5 It is also in 
Delhi that the programmes are the most competitive. In 2001, 1,416 candidates 
competed nationally for the sixty-nine places offered for the Master’s degree in 
‘Politics, International Studies’ at the SIS at JNU, with 748 for the twenty places offered 
for the Master’s degree in international economics and 901 for the 139 places available 
for the MPhil/PhD course (Mattoo 2009, 39–40). Publishing patterns are also Delhi-
centred. As shown by Sharma in her analysis of the journal International Studies, less 
than 10 percent of the articles published between 2003 and 2008 were written by 
scholars based outside Delhi (2009, 82). 
 The interviewees’ discourses reflected this situation as it distinguishes between 
the institutions of the capital and those designated as ‘regional’. Students come from all 
over the country to study at JNU, described as a training factory diffusing its 
pedagogical imprint to other institutions. However, young doctors have traditionally 
been reluctant to teach outside the capital due to the lack of resources at regional 
institutions (Mattoo 2009, 39; Paul 2009, 135; Behera 2007, 344). Despite increasing 
mobility, some interviewees described how distressing and/or exotic academic trips 
within the country outside Delhi could be. A young scholar from Rajasthan reported 
that he almost cancelled a job interview in Pondicherry due to the unsettling character 
of the expedition. His mother finally convinced him to go, as this was maybe the only 
opportunity he had to see the ocean. As illustrated by the following excerpt from a JNU 
professor, leaving Delhi to work in a region feels like going to work in a foreign 
institution: 
This is new for us. […] A lot of younger scholars are willing to go anywhere 
and teach, even within India. For example, our students go and teach all over 
the country. Recently one of my students was teaching in Bhutan, he came 
back and joined another university in India now. That is happening now 
because we find that accessibility of communication with home now is 
possible, that the confidence of going and working far away from home is 
possible now. 
The alleged ‘national’ character of IR in India is further challenged by the absence of a 
national structure organising IR research. This situation might be changing soon as, 
since 2012, the Annual International Studies Convention has been holding national 
conferences. In the meantime, regional diversity and lack of exchanges generate 
professional localism. Interviewees expressed that they hardly felt like they belonged 
to a national community. This was even more likely to be so if they taught in a political 
science department where they may be the only IR scholar. The absence of national 
institutions supporting the discipline and encouraging networks has hindered 
communication (Rana and Misra 2005, 112; see p. 000). Scholars outside Delhi were 
the most prone to feeling isolated. However, the diffusion of the internet tended to 
reduce their sense of isolation, by enabling them to have a better idea of what is being 
done outside their institution. 
 Citation patterns reflect this lack of communication. Behera underlines the ‘lack 
of mutual acknowledgement’ between Indian IR scholars, illustrated by the scarcity of 
references to each other (2007, 344). A.P. Rana and K.P. Misra underline that the few 
existing citations are not ‘dialectical’ but only reflect professional sympathies (2005, 
111). The low number of collective works also needs to be taken into account. Sharma 
shows that between 2003 and 2008 only fourteen articles were co-written in 
International Studies and South Asian Journal. Moreover, she adds that ‘all of these 
[were] co-authored by scholars with the same disciplinary background or departmental 
affiliation’ (2009, 83). 
 These two cases demonstrate the relevance of apprehending social sciences in 
its localised context of production. However, rather than situating this localisation as 
‘national’, we see that the national is a contested space for the construction of IR 
specialisations. Besides, rather than being supranational, the international is intertwined 
with sub-national, institutional and regional logics and participates in the competition 
among different traditions in cases where the field is structured enough to become a 
space of struggle. In Brazil, institutional competition takes precedence over the 
diversity of local interests. The introduction of foreign influences and construction of a 
national IR field happened at the same time. Competition between different national 
traditions, which benefit from this label because of their very participation in this 
competition, reflect the international and sub-national dynamics of IR production and 
traditionalisation. In India, the Delhi-centrism of the discipline and the absence of a 
national field prevent institutional competition from occurring and generate a certain 
localism stemming from the diversity of local interests. 
 In Brazil and India, internationalisation is part of the process of nationalisation 
of research rather than its denationalisation. Following Terry Shinn et al., I would say 
that the vision of ‘internationalisation’ of national scientific fields as a recent process 
taking place after their ‘national’ creation is ‘a short-sighted history’. Rather, for 400 
years, processes of nationalisation and denationalisation have been happening 
simultaneously (1997, 1). In Brazil, all scientific disciplines are exogenous, and, in 
India, all but legal and linguistic studies (Shils 1969, 345). Underlying the absence of 
scientific disciplines before colonialism does not amount to say that there were no 
individuals and social groups dedicated to studying the world, experimenting with it 
and inventing things to improve their relationship to it. It is one thing is to say that 
scholars and other social groups (like shamans for instance) fulfil the same social 
function, and to compare their epistemologies according to the same standards (Stehr 
and Ufer 2010; Castro 2009), and another one to assume that science as a profession 
and institution is universal and has historically developed evenly around the world. 
Thus, a priori reifying and opposing the processes of internationalisation and 
nationalisation, and positing the national as chronologically prior to the international 
prevents us from understanding the dynamics organising the global circulation and 
institutionalisation of science. It also implicitly presents the history of social sciences 
in Europe as the model for the internationalisation of science in the world (see Chapter 
5). 
Tensions between national and international arenas of struggle 
On the one hand, the narrative of Western dominance reifies ‘the national’ and ‘the 
international’ when they represent joint processes. On the other hand, however, it fails 
to acknowledge that ‘the national’ and ‘the international’ represent two arenas of 
struggle and professional engagement in which scholars pursue different objectives. 
The narrative of Western dominance assumes that ‘Global IR’ is the ‘locus of struggles’ 
(Bourdieu 1975, 19) of ‘scholars from the Global South’. By doing so, the narrative of 
Western dominance merges, or collapses, ‘the national’ with ‘the international’. More 
precisely, it presumes that ‘the international’ professional space, in which critical 
scholars are invested with the ‘Global IR’ project, is also that towards which ‘scholars 
from the Global South’ direct their engagement with diversity and emancipation. 
Prioritising a scale of analysis is a political choice (Ferguson and Gupta 2002). In the 
case of the diversification of IR, this (unconscious) choice of the critical literature is 
problematic as the international diversification and emancipation leading towards a 
‘post-Western IR’ contradict the processes of diversification and emancipation in which 
Indian and Brazilian scholars are engaged at the national level. The literature not only 
fails to understand Indian and Brazilian scholars’ interests and concerns, but it also 
projects its own interests (which originated outside these communities) on to them. 
 This section presents three cases for which the ‘post-Western’ diversification of 
‘Global IR’ clashes with Indian and Brazilian primary and everyday concerns for 
emancipation and diversification in their national spaces. 
IR’s postcolonial hangover in India 
With the transformation of India’s international position, Indian scholars underline the 
need to address ‘a problem-solving or policy-agenda […] which is more immediate than 
is the research agenda defined by a problematique’ (Bajpai 2009, 115). Indian 
researchers, however, lament the fact that IR has failed to take up this challenge in India 
(Harshe 1997; Mahajan 2010, 59). And it is the parochialism of Indian IR and its 
dependence towards the state (see Chapter 2), rather than its ‘Westernisation’, that has 
prevented Indian scholars from meeting their objectives. This situation illustrates the 
tension between ‘Global IR’s cravings for international diversification (which would 
benefit from localised ‘Indian’ works) and Indian IR scholars’ interests – for which 
internationalisation represents a way out of their dependence. 
 In India, the very nationalism that resisted colonial rule and in which IR scholars 
participated during the formative years of the discipline (see Chapter 2) is now 
preventing scholars from emancipating themselves from the disciplinary hold of the 
state. Different conceptions of how India as a nation should play a role in international 
politics have existed since before independence. However, the idea that the nation 
should be defended at the international level was the object of a postcolonial consensus 
(Sagar 2009). The once anti-hegemonic alliance between IR and the Indian state 
suffocates scholars in a field where nationalism, state control and parochialism prevail. 
This context of dependence makes it hard for IR scholars to produce a critical discourse 
in national debates. The expression ‘postcolonial hangover’ used by an interviewee 
describes the condition suffered by Indian IR scholars: a disciplinary dependence on the 
state resulting from what once was a postcolonial emancipatory position. He explained 
as follows: 
The conclusion that I have come to is that the postcolonial hangover is part 
of the fact of being postcolonial, because no matter how rigid the state may 
be, it’s our state, it’s the state we won from the colonial masters, after a great 
deal of struggle: that state. By being sovereign, we have a status in the 
international system. Otherwise, we didn’t have as a colony. So what we 
have is that the notion of the state as an oppressor which is very powerful in 
Indian social sciences generally in fact – but when it comes to International 
Relations, that image of the state as an oppressor seems to fade away and we 
have the notion of the state as a protector. 
Interviewees expressed the need for the current generation to emancipate themselves 
from this image of the state in order to acquire a more critical position. According to 
Rana and Misra, contemporary researchers are still ‘overly impressed and influenced 
by state practice’ (2005, 79). Behera underlines the implicit adoption of professional 
models and images of the state such as ‘the infallibility of the Indian state modelled 
after the Westphalian nation-state’ acquired through socialisation to IR (2007, 348). 
 This ‘hangover’ takes the form of widespread Indian nationalism in Indian IR. 
This nationalism was openly assumed by a few interviewees who warmly welcomed 
me by thanking my country, France, for supporting Indian nuclear tests. A few 
interviewees also explained that nationalism was stronger in an international context, 
where Indian researchers tended to get closer to the views of their government: 
For example, I realised that a lot of people in IR in India, they tend to become 
ambassadors of India’s foreign policy positions when they go outside the 
country. They tend to take a very uncritical approach towards Indian foreign 
policy. It’s like they feel it’s their own responsibility to defend Indian foreign 
policy. […] It’s really funny you know because you see Indian policy 
seminars in India, where only Indians are present, and then you see a seminar 
where half are Indian, and half are foreigners. The same people they’ll say 
different things. 
Considering these elements, the common statement that IR in India is dominated by 
realism can be interpreted as a euphemism to describe its nationalism (Batabyal 2011). 
The general assumption is that realism prevails in India. Yet, very few scholars actually 
define themselves as working in a realist framework. In fact, the scholars that have been 
personally identified as realists by their peers expressed their feeling in the interviews 
of being isolated in India. In the introduction of their book International Relations: 
Perspectives for the Global South, B.S. Chimni and Siddarth Mallavarapu mention the 
existence of two realist authors in India: one of them who wrote a chapter for this edited 
volume, the other being Kautilya, who died more than 2,000 years ago (2012, 10). When 
I interviewed the scholar selected for the chapter, he confirmed that the editors did not 
have a choice, as he was the only one they could find to contribute with a realist 
approach. According to this interviewee, what is commonly qualified as ‘realism’ in 
India would be labelled ‘conservative’, ‘neo-con’ or ‘traditional nationalism’ in the US. 
He expressed the irony of the underrepresentation of ‘real’ realists in a country 
supposedly dominated by this paradigm. 
 By opposing ‘mainstream’ IR to what is produced ‘locally’ (Vasilaki 2012, 6; 
Knutsen 2014, 448), the literature assumes ‘non-Western’ IR to be ‘dissident’ or 
‘critical’. However, rather than ‘Western dependence’, it is the lack of distance of IR 
towards the state and the government that represents the main concern for IR scholars 
in India (Alagappa 2009, 29; Rana and Misra 2005, 79). Understanding this core 
dimension of the context structuring the socio-historical construction of IR in India 
highlights the tension that may exist between the ‘international’ interests of the 
literature and the ‘national’ interests of Indian scholars. It also provides new, decentred 
ways of interpreting IR knowledge production in India. I will give three examples. 
 First, the policies valued by Indian scholars to become more independent 
towards their state – such as the internationalisation of funding and international 
mobility programmes – (further details on p. 000) are commonly identified as 
participating in ‘Western’/‘US’ IR homogenisation and dominance (Alejandro 2017). 
It was indeed as a result of non-alignment anti-Western political strategies that these 
transnational mechanisms were restricted in the first place (see Chapter 2). Second, if 
the universalisation of focus on the Westphalian state is perceived as Eurocentric 
(Kayaoglu 2010), IR’s postcolonial obsession with the state has resulted in Indian IR 
neglecting non-state-centred topics. This obsession, however, is less a product of 
Western dominance in IR than the normalisation of the state as the main political form 
of governance (via colonialism) and the subsequent need to legitimise it in postcolonial 
newly independent countries (see Chapter 2). Thus, tension emerges between critical 
IR’s demand for non-state, non-‘Western’ objects and Indian IR’s political participation 
in the postcolonial legitimation of the Indian state. 
 Finally, it is the nationalistic cradle of Indian IR, rather than Western dominance 
in IR, that has prevented the theorisation of non-alignment or non-violence (see Chapter 
1). Indeed, creating a debate around such doctrines could have appeared as a non-
patriotic stance in the decades following independence. If scholars in sociology or 
political science had the luxury to criticise the Indian state and problematise the 
doctrines emanating from Indian political leaders while serving the postcolonial 
nationalist purpose, the specific object of IR required IR scholars to back up the 
government in its international politics of legitimation (see Chapter 2). 
The definition of ‘Indian’ IR 
Calls for ‘non-Western’ IR traditions do not take into account the consequences and 
meanings of this traditionalisation in national contexts. In the case of India, the potential 
construction of ‘Indian IR’ takes place in the environment of a double opposition 
between different forms of nationalism, and between nationalist and anti-nationalist 
movements. By incentivising the internationalisation of IR around ‘national’ traditions, 
the ‘Global IR’ literature essentialises and legitimises certain positions as being the 
national – i.e. ‘the Indian’ – tradition. By doing so, it not only collapses the complexity 
of the co-construction of identities on the ground, but it also subsumes it to the image 
of ‘Indianness’ that the critical literature projects on to Indian scholars. 
 Taking into account the meaning and values associated with the Arthaśāstra in 
the Indian political context illustrates this tension. India is often referred to in the 
‘Global IR’ literature as a site of ‘non-Western’ IR theorisation due to the presence of 
pre-colonial texts discussing international politics. However, as shown in Chapter 1, 
Indian scholars are only marginally using pre-colonial sources for IR theorising, neglect 
that the ‘Global IR’ literature interprets as proof of Western dominance. 
Acknowledging the diversity of the stakes structuring national and international 
professional spaces enables us to offer an alternative interpretation to this neglect. If 
Indian scholars are not using the Arthaśāstra in IR, it may not only be because they are 
not interested in participating in this backwards-looking revival (as shown in Chapter 
1) but also because the Arthaśāstra represents a controversial symbol whose values they 
do not support. The meanings and uses of the Arthaśāstra in the international space of 
‘Global IR’ literature and in Indian national space are not only different, but also 
contradictory. 
 Looking into the Indian reception of the Arthaśāstra helps us to understand why, 
in contrast to foreign scholars’ interest, Indian IR scholars have refrained from using 
this work. In his pioneering article of 1919, Benoy Kumar Sarkar exposes the interest 
in the Arthaśāstra for theorisation in IR. Rather than qualifying this theory as ‘Indian’, 
he explicitly entitles his article: ‘Hindu Theory of International Relations’. The demand 
of ‘Global IR’ for national traditions flattens these distinctions. In the Indian context, 
however, we see that the ‘Indianisation’ of academic traditions (calling them ‘Indian’ 
in the context of an extremely diverse society) can represent two politically opposed 
strategies. On the one hand, references to an ‘Indian tradition’ can be nationalist 
attempts to naturalise one’s own vision as the vision of the nation. Assimilating the 
Sanskrit tradition (broadly speaking representing Hindu sacred elite knowledge) to ‘the 
Indian tradition’ excludes, for example, vernacular sources and the Islamic legacy of 
Indian political thought from the construction of national academic traditions (Das and 
Randeria 2015, 87). In contrast, references to ‘Indian traditions’ can also reflect an 
inclusive stance. As noted by Veena Das and Shalini Randeria, for Indian social 
sciences in general, ‘the aspiration for an “Indian” sociology or an “Indian” perspective 
on history can also be read as a criticism of the now increasingly predominant right-
wing idea of an Indian history as exclusively “Hindu” history’ (2015, 86). 
 The same logics of inclusion/discrimination debated at the international level by 
‘Global IR’ literature happen at the national level. Meanwhile, the critical literature fails 
to acknowledge, and thus contradicts, the scholars’ primary engagement for diversity 
in their national field. 
 In India, the use of and appeal to Sanskrit literature is commonly associated with 
a conservative (potentially castist) Hindu posture, as Sanskrit was traditionally used by 
the Brahman elite in opposition to vernacular languages. A scholar interested in the 
Sanskrit tradition and identified as conservative by other interviewees expressed how it 
was a relief for him to go to the US, as there he could exchange ideas about Indian 
Sanskrit sources and their relevance to IR. In India, however, these conversations 
generated a consensual resistance in the social sciences. 
 Moreover, the Arthaśāstra per se refers to the image of a monarchic, militarist 
and expansionist India. According to the tradition, Kautilya was a counsellor of 
Chandragupta Maurya who laid the foundation for the Gupta Empire, said to be India’s 
Golden Age. The empire ruled by Chandragupta Maurya was the largest that ever 
existed in the Indian subcontinent. The Arthaśāstra, a major opus of Indian political 
thought, refers to this well-known past that some ideological groups wish to recreate in 
the present (if only symbolically) and that others oppose. 
 To give an example of the reception of the work in the national context, at a 
presentation on Kautilya made by a German researcher at the Institute for Defence 
Studies and Analyses (a think tank funded by the Ministry of Defence), a colonel 
commented: ‘Kautilya’s thought and philosophy needs to be studied in a contextual yet 
rigorous, scientific, and a-religious manner, and not on the initiative of the religious 
right wing’ (IDSA 2012). 
 Finally, JNU – the elite institution that is most likely to produce theories and to 
internationalise IR research – is also the farthest away from the political line associated 
with the Arthaśāstra. This elite university is known for its Marxist political position, as 
demonstrated recently by the 2016 JNU student union protests (which has close ties 
with India’s communist party) against the Hindu-nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party. 
Thus, JNU scholars may have better resources, skills and desire to theorise IR. 
However, JNU’s scholars may also be less familiar with the Sanskrit tradition and less 
keen on using it to create publications that would fit the expectations of ‘Global IR’. 
 If, from an international perspective, the use of theorisation of the Arthaśāstra 
can be interpreted as an emancipatory move by ‘Global IR’ scholars, in its national 
context of emergence, the Arthaśāstra is historically linked with oppressive, 
homogenising social and political positions. 
Brazil – social/natural sciences 
The policies supporting the internationalisation of IR publications in Brazil enhance the 
international representation of Brazilian scholars. However, at the national level, this 
internationalisation relies on a policy of homogenisation of the criteria of publication 
and internationalisation of research, which takes natural science as a model. 
 Contrary to the discrimination of social sciences vis-à-vis science and 
technology in India, Brazilian social sciences have benefited from state support (see 
Chapter 3). However, another opposition between social and natural sciences emerges 
around the imposition of the criteria for the evaluation of research exposed in Chapter 
3 (for example Qualis). Brazilian IR scholars (along with scholars in other social 
sciences) perceive that the criteria used in research evaluation are based on natural 
science publishing models that do not match their discipline.  
While scholars underlined the positive effects of the evaluation criteria 
(regarding internationalisation and productivity), they criticised the homogenising 
consequences of standardising publications based on physics and biology. Qualis, for 
example, does not assess books and book reviews, as these publishing formats are 
barely used in natural sciences. In the following excerpt, a second-generation professor 
from Brasilia admitted she stopped writing book reviews since the implementation of 
Qualis: 
There are things that are incredible, for example, book reviews; it’s 
something that I used to do, it’s something I won’t do anymore because they 
don’t bring any benefits to the evaluation. When you do the book review, 
you read a book, you make a comment, it’s very important. In all the journals 
you always have a section for that, for us, it’s a waste of time. In Contexto 
Internacional, they don’t even have the space for that, it’s horrible, the rules 
of the CAPES change scholars’ behaviour. Really, when you do something, 
and it’s not worth anything when it doesn’t even appear on the CV… 
Scholars holding responsibilities in the Coordenaçao de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de 
Nivel Superior (CAPES), and the Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e 
Tecnológico (CNPq) committees (two of the main agencies organising higher education 
and research in Brazil) are the privileged witnesses to this antagonism. At the time of 
the interviews, they were worried by the fact that the executive teams of the scientific 
agencies all had a natural sciences background (one scholar referring to them as a 
‘natural sciences gang’). This lack of diversity raised scepticism vis-à-vis their capacity 
to understand the specific logic of the social sciences disciplines; and interviewees 
holding responsibilities in committees who expressed their feelings of powerlessness in 
front of the ‘general norms’ coming from ‘above’ and within which they had to 
manoeuvre. 
 An interview with the Director of the Evaluation and International Cooperation 
of the CAPES confirmed the perceptions of the interviewees relative to the 
standardisation of scientific development in Brazil. Rather than identifying the ongoing 
homogenisation as a collateral effect of the quick implementation of Qualis, the director 
described the process of homogenisation as a voluntary effort to unify evaluation 
criteria across agencies and disciplines. 
 In this context, ‘Global IR’ scholars may hail the increased international 
visibility of Brazilian scholars, but, in doing so, they need to be careful not to deny the 
consequences of this internationalisation on the national diversity of academic models. 
 To conclude, these examples show that the diversification and emancipation 
concerns of Brazilian and Indian scholars focus primarily on ‘the national’ space as the 
locus of struggle rather than on ‘the international’ and its alleged ‘anti-Western’ 
dominance. By not acknowledging this situation, the narrative of Western dominance 
implicitly posits that the ‘international’ – which it represents as the space of major 
engagement – is a universal priority and the core concern structuring scholars’ 
professional engagement around the world. 
The polarisation of national/international in the discourses of the 
interviewees 
The aim of the ‘Global IR’ literature may be to better ‘reflect the voices, experiences, 
knowledge claims, and contributions of the vast majority of the societies and states in 
the world, and often marginalizes those outside the core countries of the West’ (Acharya 
2014). The objective of this book series is, for example, to find ‘alternatives for thinking 
about the “international” that are more in tune with local concerns and traditions outside 
the West’ (Worlding beyond the West 2018). However, the narrative of Western 
dominance does not take into account the perception ‘scholars from the Global South’ 
have regarding ‘the national’ and ‘the international’ in IR. 
 What are the meaning, values and experiences of Indian and Brazilian scholars 
regarding ‘the national’ and ‘the international’? The study of the Indian and Brazilian 
IR literature and the interviews reveal that these scholars also polarise ‘the national’ 
and ‘the international’. However, in contrast to the narrative of Western dominance, 
they do not describe ‘the international’ as a limiting space (out there) or a (transnational) 
malevolent force and ‘the national’ as an anti-hegemonic emancipatory space. Their 
everyday experiences of internationalisation and their narratives of ‘the international’ 
reflect a different type of relationship between ‘the national’ and ‘the international’ in 
which the international mainly represents a space of positive experiences and a resource 
to cope with their national problems. 
The narrative of Western dominance in the interviews 
When asked about the narrative of Western dominance, Indian and Brazilian scholars 
were aware of it and knowledgeable about the ‘Global IR’ literature supporting it. On 
the one hand, as shown in Chapters 1 to 3, when asked about their work and trajectories, 
scholars’ discourses contradicted the narrative. On the other, despite describing 
experiences contradicting the narrative, when explicitly asked about Western 
dominance in IR, some of the scholars agreed with it. Investigating the relationship of 
Indian and Brazilian scholars to the narrative of Western dominance will enable us to 
make sense of this contradiction. 
 Brazilian scholars (apart from a few cases) disagreed with the narrative, while 
Indian scholars tended to agree with it. These results confirm the results of the TRIP 
survey of 2014.6 Scholars from thirty-two countries were asked to give their opinion 
(strongly disagree/disagree/neither agree nor disagree/agree/strongly agree) about a 
series of question including the following statement: 
 ‘Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the statement: 
“The discipline of international relations is a Western-dominated discipline.”’ 
 In Figure 4.1, I compiled the ‘strongly agree’/‘agree’, and ‘strongly 
disagree’/‘disagree’ replies of the Indian and Brazilian researchers surveyed, as well as 
researchers from other national communities, to offer an overview of the diversity of 
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results of ‘non-Western respondents’ offers striking results diverging from the image of 
the field diffused by the narrative of Western dominance. Moreover, responses of 
scholars belonging to this group are more diverse, as illustrated by the few examples 
displayed in the graph in which a majority of Taiwanese and Brazilian scholars 
disagrees with the narrative of Western dominance while a majority of Indian scholars 
agrees with it. 
 The interviews with Indian and Brazilian scholars complement the TRIP survey 
by offering the qualitative elements necessary to understand the meaning behind 
scholars’ discourses in the light of their context of production. The narrative of Western 
dominance is marginal in Brazil and only two types of scholars mentioned the existence 
of such dominance: scholars of the first generation who had been influenced by anti-
imperialist Third Worldism, and young scholars and PhD students who had not 
experienced first-hand internationalisation. In India, the narrative of Western 
dominance is not so much socially localised, as it is a product of the situation of 
utterance. The same Indian scholars would adopt or not the narrative of Western 
dominance depending on the topic of the conversation, the audience and the institutional 
context (for example in international conferences, national conferences, interviews and 
informal conversations). 
 In each case, the narrative was not supported by first-hand experience. On the 
contrary, the discourse produced by the interviewees on two other topics – everyday 
professional practices and personal experiences of internationalisation – contradicted 
the narrative. When interviewees mentioned the existence of Eurocentric gate-keeping 
practices for internationalisation, I asked for details about the type of experiences that 
led to adopting this perspective. The interviewees could not provide evidence 
supporting this statement. At this stage of the interviews, two scenarios emerged. First, 
some interviewees solved the contradiction by concluding that this perception of the 
field was not linked to any lived or known experience. Significantly, my questions 
sometimes led to a reflexive moment when the interviewees realised the self-limiting 
character of this belief, as shown in the following excerpt with a PhD student from São 
Paulo: 
Q – And why [does] publishing abroad seem impossible to you? 
A – Well… I don’t know! That is a very interesting question indeed… [Laughs]. I didn’t 
think about it… so I think there must be a gate-keeping of … how can I say that? 
More than a real gate-keeping; an invisible gate-keeping, something like that. A 
gate-keeping that results in making us believe it’s not possible to do it. That’s the 
reason. 
Second, several Indian scholars tried to find proof to back up the narrative. In doing so, 
they simultaneously described national professional conditions contradicting the 
narrative (exposed in Chapters 1 to 3) and defended the narrative. As shown in Chapter 
2, it is uncommon for Indian IR scholars to send articles for publication in peer-
reviewed international journals. It is thus difficult to find scholars whose articles have 
been rejected and can talk about the first-hand experience of gate-keeping practices. In 
the following excerpts, two Indian scholars pointed to the low number of Indian IR 
scholars publishing in international journals. In compliance with the narrative of 
Western dominance, they argued that this small representation was due to the 
marginalisation of Indian scholarship by Western gate-keeping practices. However, the 
personal experiences that were supposed to support this argument, in fact, contradicted 
it. In the first excerpt, the internationalisation of the scholar’s publication was 
successful. In the second excerpt, the scholar attributed her article’s mixed reception to 
factors that had nothing to do with her ‘peripheral’ status: 
Excerpt 1: 
Q – To which journal have you sent this article? 
A – A volume edited by [two famous international scholars], the third one. This is 
another thing that I acutely feel that I have not done in my career life. And every 
year I just promise myself and I just get overwhelmed. I need to publish a lot more 
in international journals, this international discourse is something one has to enter 
and intervene and it’s not easy, there are gate-keeping practices that keep yourself 
off […]. And we know when we tried to publish we send it, the kind of problems 
we’re facing, it’s not easy but that’s the kind of problems, and we deal with that, 
I haven’t even tried seriously to do that, I need to publish more, it’s been a surprise, 
yesterday a few things have happened. Some international journal has written to 
me, it was a very pleasant surprise for me because I got this, Cambridge Review 
of International Affairs, I didn’t know there was such a journal. They sent me an 
article for a referring purpose, which was quite surprising. I don’t know where 
they found my work and how did they reach out to me, that’s unusual, so it’s 
interesting. 
Excerpt 2: 
You can check the statistics; I don’t think there are many Indian scholars 
whose work is easily accepted by these Western journals. You know, when 
I came back from ISA Montreal, that same paper was received very well by 
the crowd; you know, the chair said it was excellent, it was excellent, it was 
much discussion and debate. When I came back, I sent it for review, one to 
England and one to America. Now the reply, the review that I got from the 
American journal, was ‘It’s a solid paper, you know, theoretically it is very 
strong in these areas, etc. etc.’, and the one that I got from the British journal 
was ‘This is, this is simply describing from the American point of view’. 
Such different reviews, so I also feel that Western journals… this is why we, 
scholars based in India, don’t publish. 
In the first excerpt, the scholar asserted that Indian scholars are aware of the ‘type of 
problems’ they face when they send articles to international journals. However, she also 
said that, first, she had never tried to send articles – suggesting that international 
constraints are not the reason preventing her from doing so; being overworked (a result 
of national professional factors) is the main reason explaining her situation. Second, she 
regreted this situation as she had published a book chapter in a well-known edited 
volume and that foreign journals solicit her – thus, she illustrated her capacity to publish 
and establish a network abroad.  
In the second excerpt, the scholar argued that Indian scholars are victims of gate-
keeping practices because they are based outside ‘the West’. She also explained that an 
article she wrote was first rejected by a ‘British journal’ for being ‘too American’ and 
then accepted by an ‘American journal’. Thus, she explained the rejection and then 
acceptance of her article not on the basis of Eurocentric gate-keepers but because of 
competition between academic ‘point of views’ within ‘the West’ which she 
successfully navigated. 
 To conclude, Brazilian scholars did not perceive Western dominance in the field. 
Indian scholars tended to agree with the narrative of Western dominance when 
explicitly questioned about it, but the same scholars produced different types of 
discourse regarding IR. When they were not explicitly asked about the narrative of 
Western dominance, they described internationalisation as an emancipatory process and 
their daily practices and problems as independent from ‘Western’ gate-keeping 
practices. 
Everyday experiences of internationalisation 
Two main themes emerged in the Indian and Brazilian scholars’ discourses when I 
asked them about their experiences of internationalisation. The first dealt with the 
transformation of the negative representations of ‘the international’ they acquired 
before their internationalisation, which were debunked by their first-hand experience of 
‘the international’. The second theme focused on the extra-professional benefits 
resulting from professional internationalisation. 
 Pre-professional perceptions of ‘the international’ were influenced by scholars’ 
socio-economic background in both countries. Experiences of internationalisation 
varied between those whose background had put them in contact with foreigners and 
had familiarised them with travelling, and those who did not have this exposure. For 
those whom professional internationalisation was their first contact with ‘the foreign’, 
‘the international’ was the object of frightening projections. Interviewees expressed two 
types of anxieties. The first type of anxiety dealt with the academic level. The 
interviewees revealed the ‘idolatry’ and ‘inferiority complex’ they experienced towards 
foreign scholars (often designated as ‘international scholars’) prior to their own 
internationalisation. The second type of anxiety referred to the fear of being rejected 
and discriminated against for being unfit professionally. In general, Indian scholars 
expressed less familiarity with ‘the international’ than Brazilian scholars. The scholars 
who internationalised their trajectories have either never perceived ‘the international’ 
negatively due to their family background or transformed their perception once they 
realised that their self-limiting beliefs were unjustified. In the two following excerpts, 
two Indian scholars expressed how academic mobility transformed their perception. 
Excerpt 1: 
In India, when you haven’t seen any place abroad… When I first went abroad 
in Uppsala, I was very timid and very scared. I didn’t know how foreigners… 
Uppsala was the first time I had gone abroad, so I was very scared, and I was 
wondering how people, how the students or whatever…would they accept 
me or will they make fun of me or what? But all turned out to be like… false. 
Excerpt 2: 
The quality of international conferences sometimes also is not so great. One 
thing I realised: when you’re in India, everything foreigner is great. 
American scholars are great, European scholars are great because they got 
methodologies, they got great institutions, they got great funding, they go 
everywhere. But the level of insights I find sometimes quite disappointing, 
they know a lot of things because they keep travelling, just by travelling to 
China twice every year, you learn a lot. 
Scholars described this change of perception as an important shifting point in their 
trajectory leading to reflexive momentum (Alejandro 2016). As their identities were 
challenged and new opportunities opened up, some of them experienced a snowball 
effect of criticality towards their positioning and capacities. In the following excerpt, 
an Indian scholar of the second generation from JNU described this transformation in 
detail: 
So I think there are very specific ways I have benefited [from international 
conferences] but in a very, not in a very material sense, but in a very 
psychological, to put it that way. […] ‘Oh if these people can do, I can also 
do it. It’s not as if just because I’m an Indian, just because I have another 
world, I can’t do what those people are doing.’ I mean they’re just like me. 
They might probably have a degree from a better university, but at the end 
of it, you read just their ideas. So if they can do, why not me? So at the end 
of it, you kind of place yourself better. You grow in confidence. You grow 
in conviction […] So you place yourself on a pedestal where you are 
mentally and psychologically able to critique their ideas. I think that is the 
beginning of growing in confidence, intellectual confidence. So this kind of 
confidence is actually acquired in international conferences. I don’t have a 
foreign degree, so my interaction with Western academics has been in 
conferences. So it’s basically because of the many conferences I go that I 
interact with the men and the kind of work that they do. 
The scholars who did not describe going abroad for the first time as the main shifting 
point in their trajectories nonetheless emphasised the private benefits gained from their 
academic internationalisation. Far from the postcolonial relationship of domination 
described in the literature, they narrated their professional internationalisation largely 
in terms of academic tourism and personal growth. They put the personal dimensions 
of this experience at the forefront of their discourse in the interviews, to the extent that 
it was sometimes difficult to collect information about professional development. The 
circulation of IR knowledge is only one small dimension in the circulation of knowledge 
in which interviewees perceived they had taken part. This perception is illustrated by 
the following excerpt from a first-generation Brazilian scholar: 
Q – You said that you had learned a lot in those international exchanges [referring to the 
visiting fellowships mentioned by the interviewee]. In these American and Dutch 
networks for example, what did you learn? 
A – Perfect, a very important thing, in Colorado, when I was in Boulder, Colorado, at 
the foot of the Mountain, of Rocky Mountains, it’s at 1,700km of altitude, a very 
beautiful place, I learned how to climb the mountain with the Americans – in fact 
I wasn’t climbing with rope – I was rather hiking high in the mountains. This is 
something I learned with them, I was not used to this practice. So we were doing 
long hikes and I learned. We were talking as much about life as about intellectual 
things. Another thing that I learned with Americans, in the American culture, and 
more specifically in Colorado and California, is diet, nutrition, physical exercise, 
what was a healthy lifestyle. This, I really internalised it. 
Scholars explained that the personal and professional effects of their academic 
internationalisation were interlinked. Some mentioned how the encounter with other 
societies resulted in a soul-searching and reflexive momentum. To take one example, a 
second-generation Indian scholar explained how academic internationalisation served 
his spiritual development: 
It makes me understand the common and the uncommon things. […] It 
makes you understand the self to look at the other. I’m sure you understand 
more about Spain and France when you are in India than when you are in 
Spain or in France. And similarly, for us, it gives us more insights about our 
own country and culture when we interact and work in different cultures and 
from different parts of the world. What is very… the greatest benefits, the 
greatest acclaim of this whole process is that I find people absolutely human 
in other parts of the world as well. 
The friendships, love affairs and questioning of prejudices that scholars experienced in 
their private life sometimes had long-term professional effects on their trajectories. To 
give one example, a Brazilian interviewee underlined how marrying an Argentinian 
scholar she met abroad impacted positively on her career. 
 In Brazil, the internationalisation of programmes was also described as going 
beyond the mere internationalisation of professional perspectives, and as a means to 
expand the students’ identity boundaries through friendships and love affairs. The 
professor who created the first IR postgraduate programme in Brazil in the 1980s 
described the personal dimension of bringing foreign students to the programme as one 
of its raisons d’être. This programme (specialising in Latin America) enrolled half of 
the students from Brazil and the other half from other Latin American countries. The 
professor underlined with humour that an international couple formed as soon as the 
first year and that they were still married at the time of the interview. 
 The interviewees’ discourses are refreshing; they tell us stories of a world in 
which not everything is about domination. Despite all the structural problems, scholars 
can enjoy their life and do so through their professional activity. These elements are not 
merely anecdotal. Such discourses offer counter-points to denaturalise the way we 
essentialise ‘scholars from the Global South’ as dominated victims of the global system. 
They also invite us to think about the origins and consequences of this perceived 
dystopia. 
Representations of the ‘international/national’ relationship 
The narrative of Western dominance implicitly describes ‘the international’ as a 
malevolent homogenising force opposing national IR emancipatory initiatives. It refers 
to ‘scholars from the Global South’ as ‘dissident’ and ‘counter-hegemonic’ regarding 
Western dominance in IR. Indian and Brazilian scholars’ discourses – both in the 
interviews and their publications – offer a different perspective. They describe 
‘Western’ and ‘mainstream’ IR as pluralistic and, in the case of India, the opportunity 
to enjoy more freedom of expression than in the national context. 
 The discourses focusing on the parochialism of IR in Brazil were marginal. One 
example, though, is worth mentioning. Vinzentini accuses Brazilian IR of being a 
‘(white) empire in the tropics’, unaware of what happens outside Latin America, North 
America and Europe (2005, 30). This account concurs with the publication patterns of 
Brazilian scholars (both regarding target audience and objects of inquiry), as they 
almost exclusively publish articles about these regions and in outlets based in these 
regions (see p. 000). 
 Indian scholars, in contrast, often distinguished Indian parochialism with what 
they identified as ‘Western’ pluralism in IR. They put forward frequent travelling and 
independence from the state as important reasons explaining the ‘open-mindedness of 
Western scholars’. A professor at JNU described ‘the festival of thoughts’ he discovered 
the first time he attended the International Studies Association (ISA). An interviewee 
who was thirty years old explained how she considered her training in a small institution 
to have lacked basic academic pluralism. She described, for instance, how she had to 
recite her lesson without formulating a personal argument for her exams. She admitted 
to being very surprised when she went for a year abroad to Uppsala. She realised that 
non-conformity towards authoritative figures was interpreted there as a sign of 
intellectual achievement. Another scholar from Delhi described ‘mainstream IR’ as a 
stimulating space for intellectual diversity: 
And yeah people tend to think of it, what people do in IR is just foreign 
policy, it’s just India foreign policy. And how good you need to be in order 
to do that? Sort of sometimes, it kind of divides within India also, and also 
because IR in India particularly, in IR in India particularly, the strong variety 
in IR which you see, thematic, methodological, IR as you can see in 
mainstream IR, in Europe, etc., that kind of thinking and writing is 
happening in very small pockets of IR in India. 
Visiting stays abroad are an opportunity to ‘develop alternative discourses’ about topics 
considered ‘sensitive’ in India, such as nuclear issues. In the following excerpt, a 
scholar working in a small institution in Chennai detailed what he perceived to be ‘the 
academic culture in the West’, that he discovered in the US and which encouraged him 
to partake in more visiting fellowships. According to him, the interest of this ‘academic 
culture’ lies in the ‘freedom of research’ and the opportunity to produce ‘alternative 
discourses’: 
Q – So you were also talking of another ‘academic culture’ in the West… 
A – So the academic culture in the West, not only in the US but also in Europe, you can 
characterise into the following issues. Number one you get a lot of freedom of 
research. The first thing is the agenda of research is free and open-ended. The 
researcher, the academic researcher, has a great freedom to choose the area or the 
sub-area of research, and then he can pursue it. Secondly, you have what you call 
an alternative discourse, which is a very important element of research. You don’t 
need to be mainstream, you can always have an alternative discourse, which is a 
very important aspect of research. Thirdly, there is an input in what is called 
critical research. You can critique a particular project; you can critique a particular 
project research there. Whereas in India, people do research on very strong 
establishment positions. Because they are always pro-establishment in India 
whereas in the United States and in Europe you can take a critical point in your 
research and work actually there. Fourthly, you have resources to support your 
research there. For example, the kind of research you are doing, International 
Relations in India and Brazil, I don’t have that kind of resources to do research 
about India and China. […] So being in this kind of institutions creates more 
obstacles than working there. […] That’s the reason I prefer to do the research 
outside the institution, and that’s why I prefer to do the research outside the 
country rather than inside the country. That is why the freedom of research is 
better in international settings than in India. 
The emancipatory character of working abroad is worth the time spent applying for 
fellowship programmes, and the other personal sacrifices entailed (for example, for 
scholars with young children). 
 The experiences of Indian interviewees question the idea that ‘non-Western’ IR 
produced on local topics automatically enhances the diversity of ‘Global IR’ by 
producing original perspectives. Indian interviewees rather perceived that being an 
Indian scholar working in India did not favour the production of a localised perspective 
due to parochialism and lack of freedom of expression in the national field. In their 
view, Indian scholarship is responsible for the lack of production of original ideas, not 
Western dominance (Basrur 2009, 106). Resistance to difference is not a privilege of 
‘the West’. Indian scholars denounce and criticise their parochialism, described with 
the same vocabulary as critical scholars denounce ‘Western’ parochialism. A scholar 
from JNU underlined: ‘ethnocentricity is not just, you know, confined to one particular 
part of the world’. Another one put forward: ‘You know we are so parochial, so narrow-
minded in our international relations outlook.’ In the following excerpt, a professor 
from Chennai distinguished ‘Indo-centrism’ from what he perceived to be American 
‘polycentrism’: 
Q – When you distinguish ‘Indian-centric’ and ‘polycentric’, does that mean that you 
didn’t feel that what was done in the US was ‘American-centric’? 
A – Well it is not really American-centric because you get to have the perspective of 
other countries also. For example, I worked on India’s nuclear doctrine in 2001. 
So by working on India’s nuclear doctrine, I focused on what is the source of 
India’s minimalism, so to define minimalism you get a conceptual framework, and 
then you get an analytical framework, so you don’t only get the American 
perspective, you also get the European perspective, and in the European 
perspective you have the French perspective, the British perspective, you got the 
German perspective. And also you get the Russian perspective, you get the 
Chinese perspective so, a research fellowship normally exposes an academic to 
many perspectives which is completely different from the kind of stereotyped 
thinking that you have in India now. Therefore these research fellowships have 
been very useful in broadening the horizon of knowledge and understanding. 
Mallavarapu denounced the absence of a ‘systematic collective soul-searching among 
the IR scholars in India’ (2009, 180). Paul, now a professor at McGill University, who 
left India after his MPhil, confided his experience of the reluctance of Indian scholars 
towards working with emigrated scholars (2009, 143). Sharma suggested that the recent 
bridges built between Indian IR and the rest of the discipline are mainly the result of 
external impulses, such as the first workshop of ‘IR Theory in South Asia’ organised 
by Amitav Acharya and Hari Singh under the auspices of the APISA (Asian Political 
Science and International Studies Association) (2009, 72).  
Faced with similar issues as scholars in ‘the West’, Indian scholars also 
developed ‘inward looking’ solutions. Alagappa perceives ‘self-critical’ appraisals 
among his colleagues (2011, 216). Accordingly, several interviewees indicated the 
ways they implemented reflexivity to account for their responsibility in the structuring 
of IR and transformed their professional practice (Alejandro 2016). The Indian literature 
dealing with challenges faced by IR in India focuses mainly on problems other than 
those related to Western dominance. 
 The fact that social actors agree with an academic discourse (e.g. the narrative 
of Western dominance) does not mean that this discourse is empirically confirmed. We 
need to be careful not to unconsciously choose what we want to hear to support the 
common sense in which we have been socialised. The contrast between the empirical 
findings and the narrative of Western dominance (which Indian and Brazilian scholars 
may or may not use depending on their social position and the situation of utterance) 
questions the social effects of the circulation and normalisation of this narrative in 
academia. Indeed, if the narrative of Western dominance does not explain the world, 
how can we explain its success and resilience? 
Conclusion 
Chapter 4 shows how the categories of thought at the heart of the discipline entail 
unquestioned assumption, and how critical literature reproduces these assumptions by 
using these categories unreflexively. The implicit relationships between the categories 
‘the national’ and ‘the international’ prevent us from understanding the globalisation of 
knowledge, reproduce Eurocentrism and participate in production of the social and 
political phenomena the narrative describes. 
 The narrative of Western dominance fails to explain the internationalisation and 
diversification of IR. In the case of IR in Brazil and India, internationalisation should 
be understood as a process happening jointly with nationalisation. If the ‘Global IR’ 
literature neglects the role of national factors in the internationalisation of the discipline, 
it also overemphasises the ‘national’ character of IR in different countries. The field is 
not as global as it seems but national traditions are more international and sub-national 
than described in the literature. That being said, the dynamics organising ‘the 
international’ (implicitly constructed by ‘Global IR’ scholars as a supranational locus 
of struggle) can contradict Indian and Brazilian scholars’ emancipatory engagements, 
which primarily address national struggles (regarding the influence of the state, other 
disciplines or the competition among institutions). What may be perceived as a process 
of homogenisation on one scale may very well be experienced as a process of 
diversification on another. Moreover, even in the case when Indian and Brazilian 
scholars also reify ‘the international’, their experiences contradict the values a priori 
assigned to it by the literature. The interviewees’ discourses contradicted the 
demonisation of ‘the international’, as internationalisation is largely described as a 
positive experience (but internationalisation should not be idealised either as will be 
shown in Chapters 5 and 6). Brazilian scholars did not perceive IR as dominated by ‘the 
West’. Indian scholars held a more complicated position. On the one hand, they 
described ‘the international’ as an emancipating space and their everyday professional 
activity as independent from Western scholars. On the other hand, when explicitly asked 
about Western dominance in IR, they tended to agree with the narrative of Western 
dominance.  
 The narrative of Western dominance reifies, merges and polarises ‘the 
international’ and ‘the national’. Based on the analysis of the implicit relationships of 
‘the national’ and ‘the international’, we see how the narrative of Western dominance 
presents ‘the West’ as a model (of scientific internationalisation), the core force 
structuring international politics (towards which the national fields would inevitably be 
drawn), and its worst actor (which the rest of the world would supposedly oppose). 
Rather than reflecting alleged ‘indigenous’ perceptions, the narrative of Western 
dominance runs the risk of performing what the ‘Global IR’ literature aims to challenge. 
Indeed, its diffusion acts as a self-fulfilling prophecy as it generates self-censorship 
strategies for scholars at the margins of the field by diffusing the idea that ‘the 
international’ is a discriminatory space dominated by an exclusionary ‘West’. 
 But the Eurocentric relationship between IR (including the critical literature) and 
‘the international’ goes deeper than that. The reification–merge–polarisation of ‘the 
national’ and ‘the international’ hides a deeper layer of Eurocentrism; one that is 
embedded in the relationship between IR traditional categories of analysis and the social 
groups implicitly associated with them. A detour via anthropological research focusing 
on the co-production of social order and linguistic and cognitive classificatory systems 
sheds light on this situation (Adell 2011, 193–250). Pioneering works on binary 
oppositions have, for example, focused on generalised social hierarchy valuing the right 
over the left (Herz 1928); the symbolic identification of the left to the feminine and the 
right to the masculine leading to the naturalisation of gender discrimination through 
social systems organised around this polarisation (Needham 1973). 
 Adopting this framework of analysis, I argue that the discipline has both fetishist 
and totemic relationships towards ‘the international’. This relationship cognitively 
supports its Eurocentrism and socially and politically enables the symbolic 
hierarchisation of ‘the West’ over ‘the non-West’. Fetishism is the practice through 
which subjects operate an emotional transfer on to a physical or symbolic object 
(positive and/or negative) attributing it inherent powers. ‘The international’ is the 
raison d’être of IR as a disciplinary field. From this disciplinary positioning results an 
ontological bias, which assumes the prominence of supranational and interstate factors 
over the national and sub-national phenomena studied by other disciplines (like 
sociology or political science). ‘The international’ embodies emotionally ambivalent 
representations: it represents either a space of anarchy capable of subverting the national 
or a space of hope in which nation states can thrive and develop. 
 This disciplinary bias becomes Eurocentric when social groups are linked to ‘the 
international’ (or ‘the global’) and ‘the national’ (or ‘the local’). This is how ‘the 
international’ acquires its totemic value. Different forms of totemism exist. One of them 
serves a classificatory function that enables organising the relationships between social 
groups through the symbolic hierarchisation of objects and categories associated with 
these groups. In the case of IR discourses, the legitimation of Eurocentric hierarchies 
through totemic identification frames the relationship between people identified as from 
‘the West’ and ‘the non-West’. On the one hand, hierarchies between ‘higher’ and 
‘lower’ politics naturalise the idea that what is happening in the higher realms is more 
important both as political phenomena and as an object of study. On the other hand, 
social groups are associated with these different social spaces – ‘the West’ being 
identified with ‘the international’ and ‘the non-West’ with the ‘lower’ levels. For 
instance, the canonical story of the discipline tells us that ‘the West’, in fact, created the 
international through the invention of the state and its diffusion. It is at the origin of the 
first and current world system, condemning other social groups to occupy the lower 
secondary spaces. 
 As a consequence, the world is cognitively divided between the all-mighty 
Western-dominated ‘international’ and the dominated acted-upon ‘local South’. The 
unreflexive use of IR core categories symbolically ascribes social roles and identities 
that mould the imagination to fit the political and social structure in which these 
categories have emerged. It is the linguistic bottom line of the implicit production of 
Eurocentric hierarchies. This implicit layer produced by the structural organisation and 
polarisation of categories of thought has yet to be empirically explored and 
methodologically transformed by critical scholars who use these categories without 
questioning whether the social effects they produce match the objectives they aim to 
achieve. 
 This reflexive exercise is a demonstration of how we can make explicit the 
implicit relationships between analytical categories and the production of social and 
political order. This relationship is only one of the socio-cognitive sites in which 
language in context produces socio-political order. Another one is the relationship that 
exists between discourses themselves. 
Notes 
1 The states are São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Rio Grande do Sul, Santa Catarina, Distrito 
Federal, Paraná and Minas Gerais. 
2 The result of the fieldwork led by Peter Markus Kristensen led to similar conclusions 
(Kristensen 2017). 
3 The current research centre of the UnB makes explicit the focus of the faculty on ‘Brazilian 
foreign policy and Brazil’s position in the regional and world context’ (Brandi 2012, 2). 
4 Of this, 5,423km belongs to peninsular India and 2,094km to the Andaman, Nicobar and 
Lakshadweep island chains. 
5 Among the most important IR think tanks, we can cite the Centre for Policy Research 
(1973), the Observer Research Foundation (1990), the Institute for China Studies (1990) 
and the Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies (1996). The creation in 1998 of the 
National Security Advisory Board, which is aimed at making recommendations to the 
National Security Council, is also worth mentioning. 
6 The TRIP (Teaching Research and International Policy) project is based at the College of 
William & Mary’s Institute for the Theory and Practice of International Relations (ITPIR). 
‘The 2014 TRIP survey includes IR scholars in 32 countries and 9 languages to examine 
teaching and research trends and foreign policy view in the IR discipline’ (TRIP 2014). 
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